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Consultation Paper: ESMA Guidelines on enforcement of financial information 
 
To whom it may concern, 
 
we are writing to comment on the Consultation Paper “ESMA Guidelines on enforcement of 
financial information”. We appreciate the opportunity to comment and support the efforts to 
improve enforcement and financial reporting quality within the European Single Market. 
Hereinafter please find our responses to the 20 questions of the Consultation Paper. 
 
Question (1): Do you think that the proposed guidelines will improve the quality and 
consistency of financial reporting in Europe? 
Latest accounting research suggests that there is an impact of enforcement on accounting 
quality. Thus, we believe common standards on enforcement within the European Single 
Market could have a positive impact on the quality of financial information published by 
issuers, although the competition of enforcement systems could also be of positive 
influence. However, it remains unclear how the quality of financial reporting or 
enforcement can be measured reliably. Moreover, it has not been researched yet, which 
particular enforcement system applied within the Member States is superior in promoting 
accounting quality.  
To get a better understanding of which particular enforcement mechanisms are of positive 
influence on the quality of financial information, we suggest an analysis of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the different enforcement systems applied within the Member States. In 
our view, this analysis is necessary in order to examine which enforcement design should 
be aimed to achieve as a result of the European harmonization process. Therefore, we  
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suggest that future regulation should be also based on the evidence gained by additional 
research on the various influences of enforcement mechanisms. 
Finally, the suggested measures to increase financial reporting quality should not be 
discussed separately from the proposed reform of the EU audit market. High quality audits 
are expected to increase the reliability and accuracy of financial information and therefore 
should also decrease the need for additional enforcement actions. 
 
Question (2): Do you have any comments on the potential costs to the financial reporting 
community of any aspects of these proposals? 
To our knowledge, there are no studies examining the costs and benefits of the particular 
enforcement mechanisms. In our view, ESMA should be in the position to accumulate 
data on the European enforcers’ (financial) resources. Therefore, we suggest ESMA to 
prepare a study on the costs of enforcement on its own or in cooperation with researchers. 
 
Question (3): Do you agree that a common European approach to the enforcement of 
financial information is required in order to avoid regulatory arbitrage by issuers? In this 
context, regulatory arbitrage refers to the position where an issuer’s choice of the market 
on which to list its securities may be influenced by different approaches to enforcement 
being applied in different European jurisdictions. 
First of all, there is no empirical evidence for regulatory arbitrage regarding the 
enforcement of financial information. Thus, we encourage EMSA to gain evidence on this 
hypothesis. Also, we refer to our answer to question (1), where we pointed out that there 
is no unambiguous evidence on the impact of enforcement mechanisms on financial 
reporting quality and more research has to be conducted on this topic. 
In addition, there are no studies showing that the listing choice of issuers depends on the 
enforcement design at the designated listing place. It has not been researched whether a 
high level of enforcement leads to an increasing attractiveness of the capital market 
because of lower risk premiums or whether a low level of enforcement quality is preferred 
by issuers to avoid additional regulation. 
 
Question (4): Do you agree with the objective, definition and scope of enforcement set out 
in paragraphs 11 to 21 of the proposed guidelines? 
In general, we agree to the suggested objective, definition and scope of the proposed 
guidelines. We also refer to our answer to question (17). 
 
Question (5): Do you agree that issuers from third countries using an equivalent GAAP to 
IFRS should be subject to an equivalent enforcement and coordination system? Do you 
agree with the measures proposed to make this enforcement more efficient?  
First of all, we encourage ESMA to clarify whether the competent authority is the enforcer 
of the resident state or the listing state.  
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We agree that issuers from third countries using an equivalent GAAP to IFRS should be 
subject to an equivalent enforcement and coordination system. We do not agree to all 
proposed measures intended to increase the efficiency of the enforcement process. We do 
not support the delegation of enforcement activities to third parties, because some of the 
enforcement actions listed in paragraph 54 may not be applicable in third countries due to 
national restrictions. However, we are in favour of enforcement actions including the 
consideration of third parties, for example by obtaining expert opinions.  
 
Question (6): Do you agree that enforcers should have the powers listed in paragraph 30 
of the proposed guidelines? Are there additional powers which you believe that enforcers 
should have? 
In our opinion, it should be clarified that market participants should be informed about 
misstatements in an appropriate and timely manner. Moreover, it should be clarified that 
enforcers can cooperate and communicate with national law enforcement agencies and 
audit oversight boards like it is stated in § 342b (8) of the German Commercial Code. 
 
Question (7): Do you agree that enforcers should have adequate independence from each 
of government, issuers, auditors, other market participants and regulated markets? Are the 
safeguards discussed in paragraphs 38 to 41 of the proposed guidelines sufficient to ensure 
that independence? Should other safeguards be included in the guidelines? Do you agree 
that market operators should not be delegated enforcement responsibilities? 
We agree that enforcers should have adequate independence from each of government, 
issuers, auditors, other market participants and regulated markets. To avoid biased 
decisions in the enforcement process, in our opinion, cooling of periods and full-time 
employments at the European enforcers are an appropriate measure to assure high levels 
of independence. 
 
Question (8): Are you in favour of enforcers offering pre-clearance? Do you have any 
comments on the way the pre-clearance process is described and the pre-conditions set in 
paragraph 42 to 45 are described? 
First of all, we agree that pre-clearance has to be organized in a formal process. However, 
the last sentence of paragraph 45 can mislead into an informal procedure. At least some 
minimum requirements for pre-clearance should be outlined within the ESMA guidelines.  
 
Question (9): Do you agree that in order to ensure investor protection, the measures 
included as part of a prospectus approval should be supplemented by additional measures 
of ex-ante enforcement in relation to financial information? If yes, could you please 
specify the exact nature of ex-ante enforcement that you would expect from enforcers? 
In our opinion, additional ex-ante enforcement of financial information in prospectuses is 
not necessary since in almost all cases the published information is derived from financial 
statements that have already been audited. Moreover, in practice the design of 
prospectuses is commonly supported or reviewed by audit firms, which also should  
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increase the reliance of the published data. However, we are in favour of ex-post 
enforcement actions on a random basis.  
 
Question (10): Do you agree that a risk-based approach for selection should not be used as 
the only approach? 
Yes.  
 
Question (11): Do you agree that the risk-based approach should take into account both 
the risk of an individual misstatement and the impact of the misstatement on financial 
markets as a whole? 
Yes. 
 
Question (12): Do you think that a maximum period should be set over which all issuers 
should have been subject to at least one full review (or to be used to determine the 
number of companies to be selected in sampling)? 
Yes. However, ESMA should take into consideration that a maximum period should not 
lead to a setting in which the issuer can anticipate the execution of (future) enforcement 
actions. 
 
Question (13): What are your views with respect to the best way to take into account the 
common enforcement priorities established by European enforcers as part of the 
enforcement process? 
The common enforcement priorities have to be taken into account while determining the 
(risk-based) selection of issuers. 
 
Question (14): Do you agree that the examination procedures listed in paragraph 54 of the 
proposed guidelines are appropriate for an enforcer to consider using? Are there other 
procedures which you believe should be included in the list?  
Especially in a two-tier-board-system, the supervisory board or the audit committee is 
responsible for auditing and approval of financial information. Therefore, enforcers should 
also communicate with the chairman or financial expert of these institutions. 
 
Question (15): Do you agree that, in determining materiality for enforcement purposes, 
materiality should be assessed according to the relevant reporting framework, e.g. IFRS? 
Yes. In general, we support the assessment of materiality according to the relevant 
applicable accounting standards. However, ESMA should take into consideration that the 
resulting materiality threshold can differ between enforcers and auditors. 
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Question (16): What are your comments regarding enforcement actions as presented in 
paragraphs 57 to 67 of the proposed guidelines? Do you agree with the criteria proposed? 
Enforcers should only require restatements (paragraph 57a) in accordance with the 
applicable accounting standard, for example IAS 8. ESMA should be aware of the fact that 
national company law may regulate restatements to a certain extent. As an alternative to 
the proposed mechanism in paragraph 57, ESMA might consider a “corrective note only 
approach”, as already implemented in the German enforcement system. However, the 
decision on this topic should be also dependent on research results concerning the 
influence of different enforcement systems on accounting quality as described in our 
answer to question (1). 
 
Question (17): Do you have any comments on the specific criteria for the submission of 
decisions or emerging issues to the EECS database? 
We agree with ESMA that accounting standards should only be developed by standard 
setters. We also agree that the development of “EU IFRS” should be avoided. The 
publication of emerging issues and enforcement decisions bears the risk of contributing to 
case-based “EU IFRS”. The interpretation of accounting standards is not up to enforcement 
institutions, as this may compromise the segregation of powers. However, an internal use 
of a database may be beneficial to ensure a consistent enforcement within the European 
Single Market. 
 
Question (18): What are in your opinion appropriate activities that would help to achieve 
a high level of harmonisation of the enforcement in Europe?  
In our view, the most important factor for increasing the level of harmonization is to make 
sure all national enforcers have sufficient human and financial resources. The manpower 
should be professionally skilled and experienced as described in paragraph 35 of the 
discussion paper. The “comply or explain”-approach as intended by ESMA may also 
contribute to an increased harmonization, while still leaving the opportunity to allow for 
national characteristics. 
 
Question (19): Do you have any comments on the transparency, timing and frequency of 
the reporting done by the enforcers with respect to enforcement actions taken against 
issuers?  
The harmonization of enforcement requires also harmonized reporting by national 
enforcers. The reports should at least include some minimum content, such as the number 
of reviews, the quantity of misstatements, and enforcement priorities adopted. The 
presentation of enforcement activities should also include at least a separation of 
misstatements concerning recognition and measurement on the one hand and disclosure 
on the other hand. 
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Question (20): What are your views about making public on an anonymous basis 
enforcement actions taken against issuers?  
We refer to our answer to question (17). 
 
 
If you would like to have any further explanation or clarification of our responses, please do 
not hesitate to contact us. 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Frankfurt/Main, October 11
th 2013 
 
         
 
(Prof. Dr. Hans-Joachim Böcking)      (Dr. Marius Gros)         (Daniel Worret) 